



WORKING PAPER NO. 10-20 











June 2, 2010 
 
 Sustainable Monetary Policy and In
ation Expectations
Roc Armenter
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
June 2, 2010
Abstract
I show that the short-term nominal interest rate can anchor private-sector expec-
tations into low in
ation|more precisely, into the best equilibrium reputation can
sustain. I introduce nominal asset markets in an innite horizon version of the Barro-
Gordon model. I then analyze the subset of sustainable policies compatible with any
given asset price system at date t = 0. While there are usually many sustainable in-

ation paths associated with a given set of asset prices, the best sustainable in
ation
path is implemented if and only if the short-term nominal bond is priced at a certain
discount rate. My results suggest that policy frameworks must also be evaluated on
their ability to coordinate expectations.
1 Introduction
In
ation in advanced countries has been low and stable for the last twenty years. Remarkably,
central banks have been able to bring in
ation under control while preserving their discretion
at policymaking. Independence, transparency, and an emphasis on price stability are usually
credited for the improved in
ation record. It is important that we have a comprehensive
understanding of how the current framework enables successful monetary policy, especially
if additional institutional changes are being considered.
E-mail: roc.armenter@phil.frb.org. The author is grateful to Noburo Kiyotaki, Keith Kuester, Jim
Nason, Jaume Ventura, and S evin Yeltekin for discussions, as well as seminar participants at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and the Society of Economic Dynamics. The views expressed in this paper are
those of the author and do not necessarily re
ect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or
the Federal Reserve System. This paper is available free of charge at www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/publications/working-papers.
1Most theoretical analysis of the monetary policy framework builds upon the literature
on commitment and discretion pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983b). The initial premise is that there is a short-run benet from unexpected
in
ation. If monetary policy is discretionary, the optimal policy is not compatible with
rational expectations and the result instead is an in
ation bias. The institutional design
is then modeled as modifying the policy objectives, either directly or through an in
ation
contract, in a way that reins in the ex-post incentives to in
ate by the monetary authority.1
An old observation is that reputation can substitute for commitment: agents may forgo
short-term benets in order to secure cooperation over the long term. Reputation arises
naturally in innitely repeated games.2 Barro and Gordon (1983a) show that low in
ation
can be sustained with trigger strategies in an innitely repeated game between the monetary
authority and the private sector. Formally, an in
ation path is said to be sustainable (or
enforceable) if it belongs to a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Much of the subsequent work
has focused on the best sustainable policy.3 Unfortunately innitely repeated games have
multiple equilibria, and some may be worse than the no-reputation equilibrium. Rogo
(1987) writes, \Repeated game models replace a cooperation problem with a coordination
problem." Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini (1994) emphasize the \problematic" aspect
of a \serious multiple-equilibrium problem;"while Thomas Sargent (1999) writes that \the
multitude of outcomes mutes the model empirically and undermines the intention of early
researchers to use the rational expectations hypothesis to eliminate parameters describing
expectations."4
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the monetary authority can coordinate
private-sector expectations into low in
ation|more precisely, into the best equilibrium rep-
utation can sustain. I show that the short-term nominal interest, determined at spot markets
at the initial date, can anchor private-sector expectations to the lowest sustainable in
ation
at all dates and contingencies. Formally, I start with an innitely repeated version of the
1This approach started with the celebrated \conservative" central banker proposed by Rogo (1985).
Walsh (1995) rst formalized in
ation contracts. The subsequent literature is very large. Other strands of
the literature emphasize learning or compare the performance of dierent Taylor rules. See Sargent (1999)
and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), respectively.
2This is not the only way to think about reputation, though. Barro (1986) and Backus and Drill (1985),
among others, show how uncertainty about the policymaker \type" allows for a dierent notion of reputation:
the \good" policymaker strives to keep in
ation low to distinguish himself from the \bad" policymaker. See
Rogo (1987) for a survey.
3An incomplete list is Ireland (1997), Stokey (2002) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).
4The quotations are from Persson and Tabellini, eds (1994), p.9., and Sargent (1999), p. 38. The
equilibrium multiplicity is sometimes regarded as a strength of the theory, as in Chari, Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1998).
2economy in Barro and Gordon (1983a) and characterize all the sustainable equilibria.5 Then
I introduce a date t = 0 spot market for nominal and real assets. By design, no action
in the asset markets changes the set of sustainable equilibria|in other words, asset mar-
kets leave the cooperation problem intact.6 I show that the mapping between asset prices
and sustainable policies is usually a correspondence, i.e., for a given asset price there are
usually either many or no sustainable in
ation paths compatible with an equilibrium. The
exception, though, is of the upmost interest: there is a one-to-one mapping between the best
sustainable policy and the highest discount price for the short-term nominal bond at date
t = 0.
This result is made possible by three key properties of the best sustainable equilibrium.
First, the in
ation rate is a function of the exogenous state of the economy along the equi-
librium path. Second, at all dates the in
ation rate is the lowest of all sustainable in
ation
rates. Third, the only sustainable in
ation path with the lowest in
ation rate at date t = 1
is the best sustainable equilibrium. These properties are closely related to the bang-bang
structure of the best sustainable equilibrium, documented in Abreu et al. (1990).
Thus the coordination problem has moved from the very large space of possible in
ation
paths to a single spot market that central banks are very familiar with. While a formal treat-
ment is beyond the scope of this paper, coordination on the short-term nominal bond market
seems possible. Central banks have a good hold of the short-end of the nominal yield curve,
through their role in primary markets, and perhaps enhanced by transparency. Crucially for
the theory, coordination should only be possible when agents' beliefs are heterogeneous|
otherwise the central bank could build up reputation at will, rendering it useless in the rst
place.
I brie
y sketch how coordination on the short-term nominal interest rate may work. I
introduce a stage with multiple rounds of \ctitious play" before date t = 0 markets open.7
In the ctitious play state the monetary authority auctions the short-term nominal bond,
loosely resembling the primary market for U.S. Treasury bonds. Each round, agents learn
about other agents' beliefs. If agents' initial beliefs are suciently heterogeneous, private-
sector expectations converge to the highest discount price for the short-term nominal interest
rate as the number of rounds of ctitious play increases.8 Interestingly, the coordination does
not hinge on the monetary authority's foresight of the very same theory presented here.
5For this I rely heavily on the work by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990).
6Thus I purposely avoid the mechanism described in Calvo (1978), for example.
7Fictitious play assumes that agents do not try to in
uence the future play of their opponents|see
Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) and Fudenberg and Takahashi (2008) and references therein.
8In a celebrated experiment, Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1993) found that auctioning the right to play led
to coordination on the payo-dominant equilibrium. See Crawford and Boseta (1998) for a discussion of the
theoretical underpinnings.
3Equally important, the central bank cannot coordinate on the best sustainable policy if
private-sector beliefs are already coordinated on some other equilibrium. This is crucial for
the theory: reputation is only as valuable as it is costly to lose it. If the monetary authority
could coordinate expectations into the best sustainable policy at any time, the resulting
game is renegotiation proof and the only resulting equilibrium would be the one-period
Nash equilibrium.
Finally, I also show that, in order to uniquely pin down the best sustainable in
ation
path with a credible announcement, the monetary authority would need to commit to a
state-contingent plan for in
ation in the rst period. Such commitment is actually sucient
to implement the optimal monetary policy.
There are two important limitations to my analysis. First, I focus on how reputation
can lower the in
ation rate. The one-to-one mapping with the short-term nominal interest
rate fails, for example, if the best sustainable in
ation rate is higher than in the Nash
equilibrium. Similarly, I have to assume that the zero nominal interest rate bound is not
binding. Second, learning dynamics are decoupled from the model, so it is not immediately
clear how to evaluate past or future institutional changes. It also remains daunting to
evaluate the theory on the basis of the observed in
ation path.
Section 2 presents an overview of the main result in the paper. Section 3 lays out the
concept of sustainable monetary policy and derives the properties of the best sustainable
policy. Asset markets are then introduced in Section 4 and the mapping between asset
prices and sustainable policies is analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 discusses a very simple
model of coordination in the short-term nominal bond. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 An Overview
In this section I outline the dierent equilibrium concepts and the main result of the paper.
Formal denitions, results, and proofs are in Sections 3 to 5.
2.1 A Simple Economy
I consider an innitely repeated version of the economy proposed in Barro and Gordon
(1983a). Monetary policy is the outcome of a game between two players, the monetary
authority and the private sector. At every period t = 1;2::: in
ation expectations ^ t are
embodied in the private sector's actions, say, by setting nominal prices. The actual in
ation
rate is t   > 0, and is directly set by the monetary authority. A Phillips curve determines
aggregate output
yt = y
 + (t   ^ t)
4where  > 0 and y > 0. Agents value output and in
ation at date t according to
 ( y   yt)
2   (t   )
2
where  y > y. The monetary authority is assumed to be benevolent: its objective function is
the private-sector welfare. The mismatch between the equilibrium output y and the output
\target"  y re
ects the presence of distortions.9 The indirect utility function can be expressed
as the negative of the loss function
l(t; ^ t) = ( y   y
   (t   ^ t))
2 + (t   )
2 :






where 1 >  > 0 is the intertemporal discount rate.10
I start by solving for the optimal monetary policy. Rational expectations imply that




at all dates. The optimal monetary policy is trivially given by the lower bound, r = .
In more nuanced environments the optimal in
ation rate may be positive and is usually a
function of the state of the economy.
It is well-known that the monetary authority must be able to commit in order to im-
plement the optimal policy in the one-period economy. Say the private sector expects the
optimal monetary policy, ^  = r, and the monetary authority has a chance to review the




The monetary authority's best response function is
 =
( y   y) + 
1 + 2 +
2
1 + 2^ 
9See Woodford (2003) for a structural model.
10Thus the lower bound on in
ation is indeed given by the zero nominal interest rate bound.
5and thus the monetary authority would choose to in
ate over private-sector expectations if
these were based on the optimal monetary policy:
 =
( y   y) + 





Hence, the optimal monetary policy is not compatible with rational expectations and policy
discretion.
What then is the rational expectations outcome in the one-period economy without
commitment? We are looking for a xed point in the best response function. That is, the
monetary authority must nd it optimal to validate the private-sector expectations,
^  = argmin

l(; ^ ):
It is straightforward to solve for the unique one-period Nash equilibrium n,

n =  + ( y   y
):
Hence, the lack of commitment leads to the well-known in
ation bias, n > r.
2.2 Sustainable Policy
In the innite horizon economy, reputation can substitute for commitment and lower in-

ation. Say the private sector initially expects in
ation to be below the one-period Nash
equilibrium, ^  < n. If monetary policy deviates at any date from expectations, t 6= ^ ,
then the private sector subsequently coordinates on the one-period Nash equilibrium n.
This strategy \punishes" the monetary authority whenever it exploits the Phillips curve.
If the threat of higher in
ation in future periods is large enough to deter the monetary
authority, then it is possible to sustain lower in




t=1 is sustainable in this manner is easy to check. At
every date t  1, the monetary authority can fulll private-sector expectations and get the





























for all 0   at all dates t  1.11 In this simple economy, a sustainable in
ation path can
also be thought of as a sustainable policy.
The Folk theorem says that if the intertemporal discount rate is low enough, i.e.,  close
enough to one, the optimal monetary policy should be sustainable. It is easy to check this.
The continuation value associated with the innite repetition of r is
v
r =  
( y   y)
2
1   
while the best deviation achieves
 
( y   y)
2






( y   y
)
2















Unfortunately, there are a lot of sustainable in
ation paths. To start with, the innite
repetition of the one-period Nash equilibrium, t = n for all t  1, is always a sustainable
plan. It can be shown that, if the optimal monetary policy is sustainable, then any constant
sequence in [r;n] is sustainable too. Actually, the equilibrium multiplicity does not stop
at deterministic sequences: it is also possible to sustain stochastic processes for in
ation.
I will be interested in the best sustainable policy or plan f
tg
1
t=1, i.e., the sustainable
in
ation path that achieves the highest value at date t = 1, v1. The optimal monetary
policy, t = r for all t  1, may be a sustainable plan, in which case it trivially is the best
sustainable plan. The cases of interest are those in which the optimal monetary policy is not
sustainable, yet the best sustainable plan improves upon the one-period Nash equilibrium.
11The concept of a sustainable plan used in the later sections is broader: reversion to Nash equilibrium is
not the only punishment possible. Condition (1) is sucient but not necessary to establish an in
ation path
as sustainable.
7The results of this paper are built upon three key properties of the best sustainable plan.
First, it is a constant sequence, 
t = .12 Second, it achieves the lowest in
ation rate
sustainable at every date. Third, as long as the lower bound on in
ation is not binding, the
only sustainable in
ation path with 1 =  is the best sustainable plan.
In the main text I work on the theory developed by Abreu et al. (1990) to formally prove
these properties. Here I just sketch the logic behind them. Let fv
tg
1
t=1 be the sequence of




t=1. I can write


















for all 0  . Why is the best sustainable plan a constant sequence? If the continuation
value were decreasing v
1 > v
2, then one can just \postpone" the start of the best sustainable
plan and do better. Note the alternative sequence f
1;
1;


















and it achieves strictly more welfare than f
tg
1
t=1. A similar argument can be made if the
continuation value were increasing v
1 < v
2 by considering an alternative sequence f
2;
3;:::g
starting at date t = 1. Therefore the best sustainable plan achieves a constant value v
t = v
for all t  1, which is only possible with a constant in
ation rate 
t = .
The second property follows easily now. Say a sustainable in
ation path f~ tg
1
t=1 is such
that, at some date t, ~ t < . The sustainability condition (1) at date t implies
 l(~ t; ~ t) + ~ vt+1   l(






for all 0  . Since v  ~ vt+1, the in
ation path f~ t;;:::g is also sustainable. Given
that l(;) is increasing in , f~ t;;:::g achieves
 l(~ t; ~ t) + v
 > v

which contradicts the denition of a best sustainable plan.
Finally, the proof of the third property also proceeds by contradiction. Assume a sequence
f;f~ tg
1
t=2g is sustainable, with ~ t 6=  >  at some date t  2. Condition (1) implies
 l(
;








12This generalizes to the best sustainable plan being a function of the exogenous state of the economy.
8Since I have already shown that the best sustainable plan is t = , the continuation
sequence f~ tg
1














for all 0  . Since the loss function l is continuous in both arguments, there exists ^  =  "
for arbitrarily small " > 0 such that
 
l(^ ; ^ )
1   
  l(






Hence the constant in
ation path t = ^  is sustainable. Since l(^ ; ^ ) < l(;), t = ^  for
all t  1 achieves more welfare than the best sustainable plan ^ v > v, a contradiction.13
2.3 Pricing Nominal Assets
To make the point of this paper clear, I introduce asset markets in a way that neither the
agent's payo nor action sets are modied by asset trading. As a result, the set of sustainable
in
ation paths is left intact and asset prices are conned to a coordination role.
All asset trade happens at date t = 0, one period before the game as described above
starts. For simplicity, only a one-period nominal bond is traded here, sold at discount rate Q.
There is no monetary phenomena at date t = 0. All private-sector agents get an exogenous
endowment y0 <  y.
Private-sector agents optimally choose their bond holdings ^ B. Abstracting from borrow-
ing constraints, the no-arbitrage condition implies
Q = 
( y   c1)




I assume that the monetary authority holdings B are exogenously dictated by a scal
authority. Lump-sum transfers balance the monetary authority budget constraint and thus
the resource constraint equates consumption with output. This renders the level of bond
holdings irrelevant for the monetary authority decision problem at any date. It also does
not aect the private-sector action set. As intended, the assumptions ensure that the set of
sustainable plans is preserved.
13Readers familiar with Abreu et al. (1990) will recognize the bang-bang property of the best sequential
equilibrium.
9An asset market equilibrium combines a sustainable in
ation path, the portfolio decision
and the market clearing conditions. Since there are no surprises along the equilibrium path,
the arbitrage condition simplies to a simple Fischer equation,
Q = 
 y   y




I assume that there is no sustainable in
ation path that makes the zero nominal interest
rate condition Q  1 bind.
The arbitrage condition (2) is a one-to-one mapping between the nominal interest rate
and in
ation in the rst period. However, the nominal interest rate does not seem to be
informative with respect to the in
ation rate in later periods. Moreover, not even the
one-to-one relationship with period t = 1 in
ation stands once the possibility of sustainable
stochastic in
ation paths is taken into account. There are usually many sustainable in
ation
paths compatible with the same nominal interest rate at date t = 0.
The key result of this paper is that, despite the limited scope of the arbitrage condition
(2), there is a robust one-to-one relationship with the best sustainable plan. That is, if the
asset market clears at price
Q
 = 
 y   y
 y   y0
1

the only compatible in
ation path is the best one, t =  for all t  1.
The properties of the best sustainable plan discussed in the previous subsection are now
instrumental. First and foremost, it is sucient to pin down the date t = 1 in
ation rate at
 to ensure that the best sustainable plan follows. Second, there is no room for stochastic
in
ation paths because  is the lowest sustainable in
ation rate. Sitting at one extreme
of the support for sustainable in
ation rates, only degenerate lotteries are compatible with
discount rate Q. It is also straightforward that Q is the highest discount price among the
set of asset market equilibria.
The nominal interest rate also coordinates expectations into the best sustainable equilib-
rium in alternative market structures. In Section 4 I formally prove the result for a richer set
of assets in a stochastic environment. Yet the result still hinges exclusively on the short-term
nominal rate.14
However, a more realistic modeling of the asset market is bound to modify the set of
sustainable plans. Nominal bond holdings are likely to shape the ex-post incentives of the
monetary authority|see, for example, Calvo (1978). Moreover, the short-term interest rate
is often not only a nominal anchor but also the operative instrument of monetary policy. I
abstracted from these possibilities in order to focus on the coordination role.
14It is also possible, but cumbersome, to prove the result in a sequence-of-markets equilibrium.
103 Sustainable Monetary Policy
This is an innite horizon economy t = 1;2;::: Monetary policy is characterized as the
outcome of a repeated game between the monetary authority and a continuum I of agents,
which are denoted as a whole as the private sector.
At the beginning of each period t  1, the exogenous state st becomes common knowledge.
I assume that the exogenous state st 2 S is governed by a stochastic rst-order Markov
probability process .
After the exogenous state is observed, private-sector agents choose some variable, zit 2 Z.
For example, some rms may set nominal prices in advance or unions may agree on nominal
wages for the period. Let zt =
R
zitdi be the average of all agents decisions. I will assume
that the private-sector agent's and monetary authority's payos depend on actions fzitgI
only through its average zt. This implies that a private-sector competitive equilibrium can
be thought of as the average action z
t solving the optimality conditions z
t =  (z
t; ^ t), where
^ t is the private-sector in
ation expectation. Furthermore, I assume that, given an in
ation
expectation ^ t, the private-sector competitive equilibrium is unique. Hence, the private-
sector competitive equilibrium can be summarized by ^ t, which is treated as the \action" of
the private sector.
Finally, the monetary authority sets the actual in
ation rate t taking as given the private
sector's in
ation expectations ^ t. In
ation is bounded below by feasibility, t 2   f  g
where  > 0.
The economy considered is very simple. Output and in
ation are linked by a classic
Phillips curve,
yt = y (t   ^ t;st)
where y (t   ^ ;st) is strictly positive, increasing in the rst argument, and bounded above.
Let y (st)  y (0;st). Output is transformed one-to-one into a non-storable consumption
good. The aggregate resource constraint is then ct  yt:
The household period payo is given by u(yt) g (t), where u is a strictly increasing, con-
cave, and twice dierentiable function; and g is a strictly increasing and twice dierentiable
equation. Function u is assumed to be bounded below and g bounded above. Finally, I as-
sume that the monetary authority is benevolent so its period payo is given by u(yt) g (t)
as well.15
I brie
y introduce the time-inconsistency problem in a one-period version of this economy.
First, I will dene an one-period Nash equilibrium|the discretionary equilibrium in the
15Foundations for this economy are discussed in Woodford (2003) and references. The use of a classical
Phillips curve formulation is very convenient. The no-reputation equilibrium is basically an innite sequence
of static economies|hence the only intertemporal link possible is reputation. For an extension of innitely
repeated monetary policy games with endogenous state variables, see Chang (1998).
11language of Barro and Gordon (1983b). I will also characterize the one-period optimal
monetary policy.
Denition 1 A one-period Nash equilibrium at state s is    such that
u(y
 (s))   g ()  u(y (
0   ;s))   g (
0)
for all 0  .
I will assume that there exists a one-period Nash equilibrium for each state s 2 S.
Denition 2 The optimal monetary policy at state s is    such that
u(y
 (s))   g ()  u(y
 (s))   g (
0)
for all 0  .
The optimal monetary policy is trivially given by  =  for all s 2 S.16 The time-
inconsistency problem arises when the two equilibrium concepts are not equivalent, i.e., the
optimal monetary policy is not the unique one-period Nash equilibrium. If this is the case,
some commitment technology is required to implement the optimal monetary policy as the
unique rational expectations equilibrium.
The set of Nash equilibrium is usually enlarged in the innite horizon economy. In partic-
ular, history-dependent equilibria arise, and some of the equilibria feature trigger strategies
that resemble reputation.
I start by introducing the notation for histories.17 Let t = f1;2:::;tg 2 t denote
the history of the monetary authority's actions up to date t  1. In a similar fashion dene
^ t 2 t and st 2 St for t  1. To denote the set of continuation histories at st, I use Sjjst,
j  t. The payo-relevant node is ht = ft; ^ t;stg 2 Ht  2tSt for t  1, with h0 = f?g.
Node ht is also the end-of-the-period history.
A consumption plan c = fc(ht) : ht 2 Ht;t  1g species a level of consumption at every
node ht 2 Ht, t  1. Let F be a probability measure over all game nodes Ht, t  1. The


































16This \boring" optimal monetary policy ensures that the analysis is focused on how reputation can achieve
lower average in
ation.





























= y (t   ^ t;st) (6)
for all ht 2 Ht, t  1.18
Now I describe the strategy space. For the private sector, the relevant decision node
is (ht 1;st) as the present state of the economy is known in addition to the history of past
actions.19 The period strategy is denoted by ^  (ht 1;st) 2 (). The strategy space contains
mixed strategies in order to allow equilibria where private-sector expectations are driven by


















The monetary authority is aware of the history of actions, the state of the economy, and
the realization of the private-sector strategy. The relevant node for the monetary authority











denote the monetary authority strategy.
The chosen equilibrium concept is the sequential equilibrium.
Denition 3 A sequential equilibrium (SE) is a strategy prole f^ ;g, a probability distri-
bution F and a consumption plan c such that:





















for all 0  ;
18The resource constraint is stated with strict equality sign. This turns out to be important since it rules
out punishment strategies based on disposal of resources|what are known as \burning money" strategies.
19It may sound awkward to talk of the private-sector strategy given that the private-sector is not a rational
player but a continuum of small agents. The distinction will be contained in the equilibrium denition; the
term strategy is just convenient.
132. For all (ht 1;st) 2 Ht 1  S;t  1, ^  is such that




almost everywhere in HtjXt;
3. For all ht 2 Ht;t  1, the resource constraint (6) holds;
4. Probability measure F is generated from f^ ;g.
The key elements of the sequential equilibrium denition are the subgame perfection
requirement and rational expectations. The former ensures that the monetary authority's
decision maximizes private-sector welfare at every decision node|this is Condition 1 in the
denition. Condition 2 imposes rational expectations: it implies that the private sector has
the correct beliefs with respect to the actual in
ation rate along the equilibrium path. Note
that Conditions 1 and 2 are very dierent. The private-sector \player," actually a continuum
of atomistic agents, does not behave strategically.
It is straightforward to show that the innitely repeated version of a one-period Nash
equilibrium is a SE. Usually there will be many SE with distinct welfare properties. The
SEs that deliver the highest welfare possible are of obvious interest.
Denition 4 A best sequential equilibrium (BSE) is a sequential equilibrium f; ^ ;F;cg
such that
v (c;F)  v (c
0;F
0)
for all sequential equilibria f0; ^ 0;F 0;c0g.
Before proceeding to the discussion of the equilibrium properties, I dene a monetary
policy plan as a probability measure M over tSt. Clearly, for a given SE f; ^ ;F;cg, the
probability measure F denes a monetary policy plan. Following Chari and Kehoe (1990),
a monetary policy plan will be sustainable if there exists a SE generating the policy plan.
Denition 5 A probability measure M over t  St is a sustainable monetary policy plan
if there exists a sequential equilibrium f; ^ ;F;cg such that M is generated by F.
I will often use sustainable plan for short.
143.1 Sustainable Equilibrium Properties
A key object in the analysis of SE is the equilibrium value set, i.e., the set of private-sector
welfare associated with a SE. It will prove instrumental to characterizing the BSE. For
convenience, I rst dene the equilibrium value set conditional on the state s,
V (s)  fv (c;s;F)jf;
0;F;cg is a SEg
and then the ex-ante welfare set
V  fv (c;F)jf;
0;F;cg is a SEg:
As mentioned earlier, the innitely repeated version of a one-period Nash equilibrium is a
SE. Hence V (s) is not empty for all s 2 S.
The remainder of this section builds on the seminal work of Abreu et al. (1990) to
characterize the set V (s) and then the BSE. The private-sector welfare can be written

































The key observation is that every subgame in a SE constitutes a SE as well. This implies















for all (ht 1;st) 2 Ht 1  S, t  1.
The next step is to dene a sustainable action  2 . Sustainable actions are the building
blocks of a SE. Loosely speaking, for an action t to be sustainable, there should be subgame-
perfect strategies such that the monetary authority validates the private-sector expectations
^ t = t. These strategies must specify a plan of action for every possible monetary authority
action, and each of these plans must be sustainable.
To characterize an action as sustainable seems potentially complicated. It is possible,
though, to easily characterize sustainable actions in terms of continuation values: for an
action  to be sustainable, there should be a schedule of continuation values in fV (s)gs2S
such that the monetary authority validates the private-sector expectations ^  = .
15Denition 6 An action  2  is a sustainable action at s 2 S if there exists vectors
w1;w2 2 fV (s0)gs02S such that
u(y














for all 0  .
Vector w1 details the continuation value for each state s0 if the monetary authority val-
idates the private-sector expectations; loosely speaking, it is the \reward." The \punish-
ment" vector w2 states the continuation value if the monetary authority does not validate
the private-sector expectations. Because continuation values belong to fV (s)gs2S, they cor-
respond to some SE so there exist sub-game perfect strategies sustaining the action . Note
also the sustainable actions are dened with a simple punishment rule: any deviation 0 has
the same punishment, i.e., the same continuation value vector w2. These simple punishment
rules are without loss of generality, as rst pointed out in Abreu (1988).
The next theorem states the key results from Abreu et al. (1990) used in this paper.
Hopefully the previous discussion has introduced the reader to the recursive structure of SE
and the role of sustainable actions.
Theorem 1 For all s 2 S, V (s) is a non-empty and compact set in <. Moreover, for any
sequential equilibrium f; ^ ;F;cg and for all nodes ht 1 2 Ht 1, t  1,







almost everywhere in Hjjht 1, j  t   1;
2. Strategy  species sustainable actions almost everywhere Xjjht 1, j  t   1.
Finally, for any prole of sustainable actions f (s)gs2S and a date t  1, there exists a
sequential equilibrium such that F assigns probability one to f (s)gs2S at date t.
Proof. See Abreu et al. (1990). For a simpler proof restricted to perfect monitoring games
such as the present one, see Cronshaw and Luenberger (1994) or Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000)
16It is useful to rephrase Theorem 1 above in terms of sustainable plans. First, it implies
that a sustainable plan M assigns positive probability only to sustainable actions. Moreover,
for a given prole of sustainable actions and a given date, there exists at least one sustainable
plan implementing these actions at the given date with probability 1. However, Theorem 1
does not imply that any probability measure M over sustainable actions is sustainable.
Everything is in place to characterize the BSE and the most important result of this
section. Using the results in Theorem 1, I show that the BSE features the lowest sustainable
in
ation rate along the whole equilibrium path. Hence, while strategies are history dependent
in a potentially complicated way, the best sustainable plan M is unique and strikingly
simple: along the equilibrium path in
ation depends only on the current state s.
Proposition 1 A sequential equilibrium is a best sequential equilibrium if and only if  (xt) =
 (st) almost everywhere in Xt for all t  1 where

 (s) = inf fj is sustainable at sg:






0)g   inf fV (s
0)g)  u(y (
0   ;s)) u(y
 (s)) (g (
0)   g ()) (7)
for all 0  .
I will use this to prove that the set of sustainable actions is non-empty and compact for
all s 2 S. First, the set always includes any one-period Nash equilibrium and (7) follows
trivially. Consider a convergent sequence fjg
1
j=0 ! ~  of sustainable actions at s. Since the
right-hand side of 7 is a measurable function for all 0  , it follows that ~  satises (7).
Hence  (s) exists and it is a sustainable action at s.
The second part of the proof shows that  (s) eectively characterizes the BSE. First, I
prove that V (s) is bounded above by
 v (s) = u(y (
 (s)))   g (






To prove this, assume there exists a SE with strictly larger value v

~ c;s1; ~ F

>  v (s1) for s1 2
S. Because all actions with positive probability in a SE are sustainable actions, v

~ c;h2; ~ F


supfV (s2)g almost everywhere in H2. Hence v

~ c;s1; ~ F

>  v (s1) implies that with positive
probability
u(y (
 (s1)))   g (
 (s1)) < u(y (






17and thus g (~  (h1)) < g ( (s1)). But g () is strictly increasing in . Therefore it would
imply that there exists a sustainable in
ation rate ~  (h1) strictly lower than  (s1), which
violates the denition of  (s1).
It follows that  v (s1) = supfV (s1)g|from Theorem 1  v (s1) 2 V (s1) as there exists a
SE featuring  (s1) at date t = 1.
The same construct for any s 2 S implies
supfV (s)g = u(y
 (s))   g (






for all s 2 S. The system of equations described by (8) proves the if and only if part of the
proposition.
Next I present a simple corollary of Proposition 1 that plays an important part in the
result. It implies that the BSE must be sustained by promising the highest reward and
threatening with the upmost punishment. Hence, if at date t = 1 the best sustainable
in
ation  (s1) is achieved for all realizations of s1, it must be that the BSE follows. The
corollary highlights the importance of the recursive structure of the SE.20
Corollary 1 If  (s) > , a sequential equilibrium with  (x1) =  (s1) almost everywhere
in X1 is a best sequential equilibrium.
Proof. Assume there exists a SE
n
~ ; ~ 0;~ c; ~ F
o
with ~  (x1) =  (s1) a.e. in X1 but
v

~ c;s1; ~ F

< supfV (s1)g. It then implies that there exists a reward continuation value
w1which renders  (s1) sustainable with 
P
s0 (s0js1)(supfV (s0)g   w1 (s0)) > 0. Since
 (s1) > , then there exists  <  (s1) satisfying (7) and contradicting the denition of
 (s1)
4 Date t = 0 Asset Markets
In this section, I introduce trade in nominal and real assets. I want to emphasize the
contribution of this paper, which is to point out the coordination role of asset prices. In
order to avoid any confusion, I lay out a trade structure that provides asset prices but
preserves the monetary policy game exactly as described above. Neither payos nor action
sets are modied; in a precise sense to be made clear later, the equilibrium value set is left
intact by asset trade.
20To be precise, it is an application of the bang-bang result discussed in Abreu et al. (1990).
184.1 Asset Market Environment and Equilibrium Denition
In addition to the economy described above, I introduce a t = 0 period when all asset trading
takes place. At date t = 0 , the private sector has an endowment y0 > 0 and there are no
monetary decisions.
There are real and nominal assets that are simultaneously traded at date t = 0. Available
real assets are a full set of contingent claims b(st), sold at discount price q (st), which deliver
one unit of output at node st 2 St, t  1. There is also a set of nominal claims B (st),
sold at discount price Q(st), which deliver one nominal unit in the event st 2 St;t  1. All
asset prices are in units of date t = 0 consumption. Repayment of all claims is perfectly
enforceable. Let q = fq (st) : st 2 St;t  1g and similarly for Q; b and B.
It is important to note that asset markets are not complete. The history of actions
ht 2 Ht introduces income volatility. Yet assets only span exogenous histories St. When
I discuss the results, it will be clear that the results go through with a more limited asset
structure or sequential trading.










for all ht 2 Ht, t  1. As the price level is irrelevant at t = 0, P (h0) = 1 solves the nominal
indeterminacy. Let P = fP (ht) : ht 2 Ht;t  0g.
The monetary authority's net asset holdings, denoted fb;Bg, are exogenously dictated
by the government. To avoid any interaction between scal and monetary policy, I assume
that the government budget is cleared via lump-sum taxes  = f (ht) : ht 2 Ht;t  0g.




































for all ht 2 Ht, t  1.
The private-sector date t = 0 asset market problem is to choose the date t = 0 consump-
tion c0, a consumption plan c = fc(ht) : ht 2 Ht;t  1g, and real and nominal assets
n




























 y0   0; (13)



























    B;
for all st 2 St, t  1 with  b > 0 and  B > 0. Importantly, the private sector takes as given
all asset prices, the monetary authority's actions as well as the lump sum taxes .
I will assume that all bonds are in zero aggregate supply. Asset market clearing then



















I also assume that the monetary net asset holdings fb;Bg never bind the private-sector
borrowing constraints.
A date t = 0 asset market equilibrium combines a SE, exactly as dened above, with
optimal portfolio and market clearing conditions. The key output is the nominal asset prices.
Denition 7 A date t = 0 asset market equilibrium (AME) consists of asset prices fq;Qg,
a price level path P, lump-sum taxes , asset holdings
n
b;^ b;B; ^ B
o
, date t = 0 consumption
c0, and a sequential equilibrium f; ^ ;F;cg such that
1. assets
n
^ b; ^ B
o
and consumption decisions fc0;cg solve the private-sector date t = 0
asset market problem, (12);
2. date t = 0 consumption is feasible c0  y0,
3. prices fq;Qg clear all asset markets,
4. lump-sum taxes satisfy (10) and (11),
205. the price level is given by (9) for all ht 2 Ht, t  0.
I have not considered the possibility that the private sector holds monetary balances,
so the nominal interest rate could be negative. To avoid this, I assume that the lowest
sustainable in
ation (s) and the real interest rate are non-negative.
Condition 1 For all s 2 S,





5 Asset Prices and the Best Sustainable Equilibrium
In this section I analyze the mapping between two components of a date t = 0 asset market
equilibrium: the asset prices and the sustainable equilibrium. This mapping is found to be a
correspondence, but the key result is actually characterized by an exception: the relationship
between the short-term nominal interest rate and the best sustainable equilibrium is one-to-
one.
I start by proving the claim that asset trading has not changed the equilibrium value set.
Of course, I disregard the trivial dierence induced by the inclusion of period t = 0. I dene
the equilibrium value set for date t = 0 asset market equilibrium (AME) as
~ V = fv (c;F)jfF;cg are part of a AMEg:
By denition, an AME contains a SE; thus ~ V  V . Proposition 2 proves that V  ~ V as
well.
Proposition 2 Let f; ^ ;F;cg be a sequential equilibrium. Then there exists a unique date
t = 0 market equilibrium with f; ^ ;F;cg.
Proof. Given a SE, the price level is trivially given by (9). Private-sector bond holdings are
given from the market clearing conditions, ^ b =  b and ^ B =  B, and the lump-sum taxes are
solved from the government budget constraints (10) and (11). The only non-trivial objects













































21for all st 2 St, t  1. The only candidate for c0 is y0, as imposed by feasibility. Hence,
for a given SE, asset prices are uniquely pinned down by the above necessary rst-order
conditions. Since P (ht) > 0 for all ht 2 Ht, and uc (c) > 0, asset prices are positive. Finally,
consumption decisions satisfy the household budget constraints by Walras' Law
Asset prices in an AME are characterized by the necessary rst-order conditions asso-
ciated with (12). Since a SE requires t = ^ t almost everywhere, c(ht) = y (st) with


































for all st 2 St, t  1. Thus the real interest rate is exogenous. The price level P (ht) is a
function only of t. This allows writing asset prices in terms of the associated sustainable


















Finally I price a short-term nominal bond. It pays one nominal unit in all states of the world







The two key outputs from an AME are the sustainable plan and the asset prices. I want
to analyze the mapping between these two equilibrium objects. It turns out to be convenient
to think of the mapping in terms of value sets. Let
 (fq;Qg) = fv (c;F)jfF;c;q;Qg are a part of am AMEg
dened over any positive asset price schedule fq;Qg. Proposition 2 has established that,
given a sustainable plan M, there exists a unique set of asset prices that constitute an AME
generating M. However, the converse is not true. Given asset prices fq;Q;g there may be
no SE conforming to an AME. Or there may be multiple SE. This is important in order to
understand the results on coordination.
First I illustrate that there may be no AME for given asset prices fq;Qg. An extreme
example is convenient. Assume there is a unique one-period Nash equilibrium, ~ , and, for
simplicity, assume it is state invariant. It can be shown that, for low enough  > 0, only ~ 
22is a sustainable action and hence all SEs must feature ~  with probability one. Therefore, for










there would be no AME with such prices. In this example,  (fq;Qg) = ? for all but one
price schedule.
Next I consider the possibility of multiple SEs associated with given asset prices fq;Qg.
For simplicity there is no exogenous uncertainty st =  s for all t  1, with y ( s) = y0.
Assume that there exists a SE f; ^ ;F;cg that places probability one in history ~ ht = f~ g
t
for all t  0 and its value lies in the interior of V ( s). Then there exists a SE f0; ^ 0;F 0;c0g
that places equal probability to histories f~  + "1; ~ ; ~ ;::g and f~    "2; ~ ; ~ ;::g with
1=2
~  + "1
+
1=2




and "1 small enough. That f0; ^ 0;F 0;c0g is indeed a SE follows from the fact that, for an
arbitrarily small "1, both ~  + "1 and ~    "2 are sustainable actions. As long as the costs of
in
ation g () have some curvature, the two SEs have dierent ex-ante welfare.
By construction, both SEs have the same asset prices,







~  + "1
+
1=2
~    "2

:
Hence these asset prices fq;Qg do not determine the ex-ante welfare level of an AME. Hence,
 (fq;Qg) is not a singleton.
Hence the mapping from date t = 0 market equilibrium asset prices to sustainable plans
is a correspondence,   : fq;Qg  fV;;g. However, asset prices are informative to some
extent. A key observation is that the arbitrage condition (17) implies a one-to-one mapping




















Many SEs or no SE may share this moment, yet it is unlikely that all SEs do. In particular,
the moment implies that asset prices constrain the support of the compatible sustainable
price levels. For example, a sustainable plan assigning probability one to prices strictly above
or strictly below q (st)=Q(st) will not satisfy the moment.
23The next is the key result of the paper. As I just discussed, the mapping between asset
prices and sustainable policy plans is generally a correspondence. However, the exception is
of utmost interest: a date t = 0 market equilibrium features the best sustainable equilibrium
if and only if the one-period nominal bond is priced at a certain discount rate.


















s1 2 S and (18) follows trivially.




































F (d1js1)  0
for each s1 2 S: It follows that P (h1) =  (s1) for all s1 2 S. Finally, Condition 1 implies
that Corollary 1 applies and the only SE compatible with (18) is the BSE
The rst thing to note about Theorem 2 is that the price of a single asset for a single date
is sucient to pin down the BSE for all periods. This stands in contrast with practically any
other complete price schedule, i.e., it is not possible to pin down uniquely other SEs even if
all asset prices can be determined. This strong result is built on the properties of the BSE
summarized in Proposition 1. In particular, the BSE belongs to the boundary of both the
value set V and the set of sustainable actions. It is straightforward to show that the best
sequential equilibrium requires the highest discount rate for the short-term nominal interest
rate.











The proof of Theorem 2 applies almost step-by-step to other asset trade arrangements.
If only the short-term nominal bond were available, then (18) is exactly the associated
necessary rst-order condition. Asset trade could also be sequential with no change in the
logic of the result. Of course, if asset holdings do change the monetary authority's incentives,
then asset prices would also bring cooperative considerations.
It is important to note that Condition 1 is in eect: Theorem 2 does not apply if the zero
nominal interest rate bound is binding for the BSE at date t = 1. It is easy to nd parameters
such that (18) would imply a negative interest rate. Interestingly, setting
P
s12S Q(s1) = 1
does not solve the problem. Because I use Corollary 1 to prove the result, if the BSE is
the optimal monetary policy, there could be other sustainable plans that start at the zero
nominal interest rate level but in
ation eventually takes o.
Finally I ask whether there is an equivalent result to Theorem 2 for in
ation. From
Corollary 1 it is straightforward that the BSE is the only sustainable equilibrium compatible
with a state-contingent in
ation vector, f(s1) : s1 2 Sg. That is, in
ation must be specied
for all possible realizations of the state of the economy in the rst period of the economy. If
in
ation is specied as a range, or at some point in the medium term, there will be multiple
sustainable in




So far my results have just moved the coordination problem to the spot market for the short-
term nominal bond. The question remains o how the central bank can achieve coordination
in the spot market. Most central banks appear to be able to in
uence the short-end of the
nominal yield curve.
Below I sketch how coordination may occur. I introduce ctitious play prior to the
opening of date t = 0 asset markets. Agents learn which short-term nominal interest rate
will prevail. A particular trading arrangement|loosely based on how the Federal Reserve
auctions U.S. Treasuries|leads to coordination on the highest discount price for the short-
term nominal bond|but only if initial beliefs are heterogeneous.21 My modeling of this stage
21There is some evidence that auctions can lead to coordination. See Huyck et al. (1993), Crawford and
Boseta (1998), and Janssen (2006).
25is so simple that it is close to trivial. In particular, it eectively decouples the learning and
coordination stages from the rest of the game. A fully satisfactory model of coordination in
the short-term nominal bond market remains beyond the scope of this paper.
6.1 A simple round of ctitious play
There are N rounds of ctitious play in what could be called the \primary market" for the
short-term nominal bond. In each round n the monetary authority allocates one unit of the
nominal bond using a second-price sealed-bid auction (or Vickrey auction). The bond is sold
at discount. The Vickrey auction ensures that agents bid their true valuations. In addition,
it is remarkably similar to the actual bidding on U.S. Treasury securities.22 Let 
n denote
the winning bid at round n.
Agents start with heterogeneous beliefs regarding which short-term nominal bond sus-
tainable equilibrium will be observed. Let i
n be a probability measure over support Q,
spanning all the possible equilibrium values the short-term nominal interest rate can take
in a date t = 0 market equilibrium.23 Posterior i
n summarizes the beliefs of agent i after n
rounds of play, with the prior i
0 being exogenous.24 Agents update their beliefs each round
with the observed winning bid, 
n, using Bayes' rule. The key property needed for the simple








with strict inequality sign if 
n > i
n 1. That is, if the winning bid is higher than expected,
agents revise their beliefs to expect a higher price next round. Other belief-updating rules
in the literature share this property.
Finally, I assume winning agents value price gains or losses linearly, so their payo is
Q   
n. In line with the ctitious play literature, agents do not try to in
uence the future
play of other agents. Thus, quite trivially, agent i on round n submits a bid equal to i
n 1.
Assuming a dense distribution of beliefs, the winning bid is given by 
n = supi i
n 1.
Now I compare the outcome of the ctitious play under two dierent set of initial beliefs.
In the rst scenario, agents' initial are heterogeneous. More precisely, beliefs i
0 span all
possible probability measures over Q so there is absolutely no prior coordination. In this
scenario the winning bid is supQ in every round. As N grows arbitrarily large, all beliefs
converge to a mass point on supQ|and thus to the best sequential equilibrium.25
22See Edwards (1997) for a description of open market operations by the Federal Reserve.
23For simplicity I abstract from exogenous shocks.
24To avoid convergence issues I actually assume that support Q is discrete, with grid points arbitrarily
close. Technically it is also necessary that the prior be non-doctrinaire|i.e., i
0 assigns a positive probability
to all outcomes|but I will ignore this point for simplicity.
25Janssen (2006) also shows how auctions can act as coordination devices without entertaining heteroge-
neous beliefs. Players bid for the right to play a coordination game; the notion of forward induction leads
26In the second scenario, beliefs are homogeneous, so i
0 = 0 for any agent i. The winning
bid is given by 0 in all rounds, and there is no update whatsoever of beliefs. So unless prior
beliefs were coordinated in the best sustainable equilibrium, a sub-optimal equilibrium will
be observed.
Thus the outcome of this simple model is exactly what is needed to implement coordina-
tion without destroying reputation: starting from heterogeneous beliefs, agents coordinate
on the best sustainable in
ation path. Once beliefs are coordinated, though, it is not possi-
ble to manipulate private-sector expectations into a dierent equilibrium. The latter part is
crucial: if reputation is a \free lunch" at all times, then it is useless.
Interestingly, the model does not presuppose that the monetary authority is aware of the
theory developed here. It only needs to target the highest discount price for the short-term
nominal securities.
7 Conclusions
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the monetary authority can eectively coordi-
nate on the best sustainable in
ation path. Eectively the coordination problem is moved
from the very large space of in
ation paths to the spot market for the short-term nominal
bond. There are good reasons to think the monetary authority can eectively coordinate
expectations on the short-term nominal interest rate; in addition, doing so seems possible
without undermining the punishment associated with a loss of reputation.
My analysis of the coordination mechanism for the short-term nominal interest rate,
though, is limited. The coordination stage is modeled as ctitious play, so it is completely
decoupled from the rest of the model. It is not clear how to embed learning dynamics in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium: the history-dependence requires agents to be quite sophisticated
regarding the strategies. Unfortunately this limitation also implies that any discussion of
the monetary policy framework must remain speculative for now.
to the Pareto-superior outcome being the unique equilibrium.
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